# 1NC

### 1nc—adv counterplan

#### The United States federal government should develop and acquire, as rapidly as possible, a conventional prompt global strike capability, space-based quantum gradiometry capabilities, and synthetic aperture radar with Ground Movement Target Indicator and Surface Moving Target Indicator capabilities.

#### Conventional PGS solves prolif

Dagobert L. Brito, Political Econ Prof @ Rice, and Michael D. Intriligator, Econ Prof @ UCLA, 3-1-2010, “Conventional Trident Modification Program,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dagobert-l-brito/conventional-trident-modi\_b\_480660.html

Global Zero has the support of the Obama Administration and was the subject of President Obama's April 5, 2009 speech in Prague following a joint statement of Presidents Obama and Medvedev committing their two countries to achieving a nuclear free world." On the surface this idea is appealing. It is hard to imagine what could be wrong with a policy to eliminate nuclear warheads whose only purpose is either to kill tens of thousands of people or to destroy an opponent's nuclear warheads. Paradoxically, however, a world without nuclear weapons could be one that is very dangerous and unstable. It is our belief that one way to make Global Zero possible is for the United States to invest in developing a non-nuclear response to a nation that acquires a small number of nuclear weapons and uses the existence of these weapons to extort economic or political concessions, such as in the current world situation North Korea and potentially Iran. One possible way to do this is to deploy a weapon such as the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) Program. As we will argue, Trident missiles carrying non-nuclear kinetic warheads could deter a country from clandestinely attempting to acquire, deploy and then use a small number of nuclear weapons for political purposes. There is a very technical literature that was primarily motivated by the Cold War, and some of the results of this body of work are applicable to the current global situation. One of the more important results is that the probability of war is high in a conflict situation where the parties have very few nuclear weapons, or even worse, where only one of the parties has even a few such weapons, which was the only situation in which such weapons were used, by the U.S. against Japan in 1945. During the Cold War, this observation led to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction or "MAD". As a result, both sides invested in a large number ICBM, bomber and missile-carrying submarines so as to have a survivable second- strike capability. It may be possible to negotiate a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, however it is impossible to eliminate the technology for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the knowledge of how to do this that is widespread and available on the Internet. Given current technology, a country with a stockpile of fissile material could be able to produce nuclear weapons in a matter of months. In a situation where no country has nuclear weapons, a rogue country could clandestinely produce a small number of weapons, given. Most of the technology needed to produce such weapons is dual-use, involving both civilian and potential military use. Thus the boundary between the capability needed to produce nuclear weapons and having such weapons has been blurred. There have been recent attempts to change the threshold from the actual acquisition of nuclear weapons that is banned by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to the acquisition of the capability to construct nuclear weapons. This is difficult, however, since the exact boundary that differentiates general knowledge from knowledge specific to producing nuclear weapons is not well defined and it becomes less defined as technology progresses. Furthermore, technical change will continue to progress. Computers will continue to become more powerful, and computer-controlled machine tools will become more common and less expensive. The only substantial barrier to building nuclear weapons may be access to fissile material. If climate change lead to an increased dependence in nuclear power then it may become more difficult to restrict access to fissile material. MAD worked during the Cold War. We will never know whether the doctrine was sound or we were just lucky. If the doctrine worked, it required a high degree of rationality and sophistication on the part of the nations involved. This may not be the case if among the processors of nuclear weapons is a politically unstable rogue state. This creates a dilemma: In a world where nuclear weapons are eliminated, a country may be tempted to clandestinely build a small stockpile of nuclear weapons for bargaining purposes. We believe, however, that there may be a way to avoid this dilemma. It may not be possible to prevent a nation state from having the capability to build nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that it is possible to develop non-nuclear weapons systems that are credible and powerful enough to serve as an effective deterrent to any nation contemplating building a small number of nuclear weapons to extort political or economic concessions. Such as system would initially serve as a deterrent to nuclear proliferation and may, in fact, make Global Zero stable. Credibility is crucial in this area. The very elements that may have made the MAD doctrine viable reduce its credibility vis-à-vis a rogue nuclear nation. It is no longer credible that the United States or any of the major powers would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against the infrastructure and population of a rogue nation that used or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have only been used at the end of WWII, by the U.S. against Japan. The decision to drop two atomic bombs in Japan is still a subject of considerable controversy. It was, however, in many ways, a logical extension of existing practices of the time. The atomic bomb was seen as a means to destroy the enemy's cities, industries, and, especially, its will to fight. The bomb did what was already being done using conventional weapons by both sides in the war. In fact, more people were killed in the firebomb raids on Tokyo than by both atomic bombs. The special horrors and the threat to the human gene pool and the environment associated with radiation were not known or well understood at the time. After the war, the scientific and military communities as well as moral and political philosophers pondered the implications of nuclear weapons. It became clear that nuclear weapons were not a very effective means for a nation to use in pursuit of its political and economic objectives. It became necessary to develop complicated and sophisticated strategic doctrines so as to rationalize the acquisition and deployment of these weapons. Ultimately, it was seen by Bernard Brodie, Carl Kaysen, and others that the role of nuclear weapons was primarily to deter their use by other nations. Although weapons designers eventually developed warheads that were "clean" and potentially useful on the battlefield as tactical nuclear weapons, the concept of a nuclear threshold that could not be crossed except at a high cost became ingrained in the strategic thinking of the mid-twentieth century. The nuclear threshold was so well defined and accepted that a small and poor country like North Vietnam was able to inflict a political defeat on the United States without fear of its use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons did not prove to be an effective instrument of war or policy, whether by the United States in Vietnam or by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or currently by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. The existence of a large stockpile of United States nuclear weapons was not a credible deterrent to their political use by minor rogue nuclear powers. In 1985 we first proposed that the U.S. reconfigure submarine-launched ballistic missiles with conventional warheads that could provide a non-nuclear deterrent that was politically credible. In 2002, together with another coauthor, we wrote a paper published by the Baker Institute at Rice University that proposed that the United States reconfigure some of its Trident II missiles to deliver kinetic energy warheads. (Anyone interested in the details of the proposal can find it on the Baker Institute website.) That proposal was sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2006 the Department of Defense received funding to start to develop such a weapon in the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) Program. The proposal differed from ours in two very important ways. First, the warheads are smaller to extend the range and, second, only a few missiles in any ballistic missile submarine would be conventional. Thus the missiles submarines would be carrying would be including both conventional and nuclear warheads. Congress has objected to the deployment of the CTM is that it could be destabilizing, as it would be impossible to differentiate between the launch of a conventional weapon and nuclear weapon. This could, indeed, be a problem if the Navy deploys submarines with a mix of nuclear and conventionally-armed missiles and launches from a location normally associated with the patrol area of submarines carrying nuclear missiles in a deterrence role. This would also require that the warhead have the same weight as the nuclear payload because it would not be possible to reduce its range. Our proposal differs in that we argue that all the missiles on a submarine be converted to CTM missiles and thus the submarines could be deployed closer to the possible targets and use larger warheads. The trajectories of a missile launch from a CTM submarine would be different from that of a nuclear-armed missile boat on patrol. Few, if any of our potential adversaries have any significant anti-submarine capability, so it would be possible to move the submarines close to their coast prior to attacking, constituting an effective deterrent. If the submarines were only carrying non-nuclear warheads, then it would be in the interest of the United States could allow other major nuclear powers to verify that the submarine was carrying non-nuclear warheads. It would be in the interest of the United States to make public - within limits - the location of the submarine. It should be remembered that the role of a CTM missile submarine would be very different from the role of a missile submarine whose mission is to insure the survivability of the United States second-strike capability. Rather, as a show of force, a potential adversary should know that conventionally-armed submarines are on patrol in the immediate vicinity. Congress commissioned the National Academy of Science to do a study of the CTM and in that study, its 2008 report stated: Major Finding 1. There are credible scenarios in which the United States could gain meaningful political and strategic advantages by being able to strike with conventional weapons important targets that could not be attacked rapidly by currently deployed military assets. In light of the appropriately extreme reluctance to use nuclear weapons, conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) could be of particular value in some important scenarios in that it would eliminate the dilemma of having to choose between responding to a sudden threat either by using nuclear weapons or by not responding at all. We believe that if the Navy is willing to dedicate some of its nuclear submarines to a CTM role and eliminate the ambiguity that has troubled members of Congress, then we should fund the deployment of the CTM. This not only reduces the value of a few nuclear weapons to a rogue state, it also makes possible the stability of Global Zero in the future.

### 1nc—elections da

#### Obama’s ahead but the race is close---voters are paying attention which means the plan could cause a shift

Cooper 10/25 Michael is a writer at the New York Times’ Caucus blog. “Has Romney’s Rise in Polls Stopped?” 2012, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/has-romneys-rise-in-polls-stopped/?gwh=20374120E0C2B79985262EFF8E8CD19D

A debate has been raging among polling analysts and commentators about whether Mitt Romney is still gaining ground, as he did after the first debate, or if his bounce has slowed or stalled. But while some Republicans say that they still have the wind at their backs, several polling analysts weighed in recently to argue that the data suggests there is no longer a Romney surge.¶ Mark Blumenthal, the senior polling editor of the Huffington Post and the founding editor of Pollster.com, wrote a piece this morning with the headline: “Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth.”¶ “While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October,’’ he wrote, “the lack of a continuing trend over the past two weeks helps counter a theme in some campaign coverage that Romney’s support continues to ‘surge’ nationwide.”¶ Sam Wang, who analyzes state polls at the Princeton Election Consortium, wrote this week that the Mr. Obama’s plunge after the first debate had **stopped with him still ahead**, and delivered the following verdict: “Indeed **the race is close,** but it seems stable. For the last week, there is no evidence that conditions have been moving toward Romney. There is always the chance that I may have to eat my words — but that will require movement that is not yet apparent in polls.”¶ Nate Silver, who writes the FiveThirtyEight blog in The New York Times, wrote Thursday: “Mr. Romney clearly gained ground in the polls in the week or two after the Denver debate, putting himself in a much stronger overall position in the race. However, it seems that he is no longer doing so.”¶ With the race so close in so many places, it can be difficult to assess the true state of play. ¶ Most major national polls, with the exception of a few tracking polls, have shown the race to be essentially tied for months. Some polls in crucial swing states where Mr. Obama has been leading have tightened between the two candidates since the first debate, including Ohio, which is closer than it was a month ago. And **now is the point where many voters pay more attention** to the election, **which can move the polls**. But even with the proliferation of polls and the increased reliance on aggregated polls — lumping or averaging many polls together — it can be difficult to get a realistic picture on any given day in the closing weeks, given that some polls do not reach voters who use only cellphones, and many polls have struggled in an environment where fewer people want to respond to questions.

#### Advocating nuclear would be election suicide for Obama---he’s backing off it now

Levine 9/7 Gregg is a contributing editor and former managing editor of Firedoglake. “Obama Drops Nuclear from Energy Segment of Convention Speech,” 2012, http://capitoilette.com/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-from-energy-segment-of-convention-speech/

That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose **not to even mention nuclear power** is important. In the wake of Fukushima, where hundreds of thousands of Japanese have been displaced, where tens of thousands are showing elevated radiation exposure, and where thousands of children have thyroid abnormalities, no one can be cavalier about promising a safe harnessing of the atom. And in a world where radioisotopes from the breached reactors continue to turn up in fish and farm products, not only across Japan, but across the northern hemisphere, no one can pretend this is someone else’s problem. Obama and his campaign advisors know all this and more. They know that most industrialized democracies have chosen to shift away from nuclear since the start of the Japanese crisis. They know that populations that have been polled on the matter want to see nuclear power **phased out**. And they know that in a time of deficit hysteria, nuclear power plants are an **economic sinkhole**. And so, on a night when the president was promised one of the largest audiences of his entire campaign, **he and his team decided that 2012 was not a year to throw a bone to Obama’s nuclear backers.** Obama, a consummate politician, made the decision that for his second shot at casting for the future, nuclear power is political deadweight.

#### Romney decks US-Russia Relations – threatens global insecurity, prolif, and extinction

Felton 12 Emmanuel Felton is a Toni Stable Fellow at the Columbia School of Journalism. "Mitt Romney Russia Quotes Signal Big Problems For Future US-Russian Relations," March, http://www.policymic.com/articles/6202/mitt-romney-russia-quotes-signal-big-problems-for-future-us-russian-relations

The importance of America’s alliance with Russia is highlighted by the very context of Obama and Medvedev’s conversation. Obama and Medvedev were speaking in private at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea. Russia is an important U.S. ally in fight against nuclear proliferation. Of the nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons that are in existence, Russia has 10,000 and the United States 8,500. Most will agree that this number is simply far too high. **An alliance with Russia is essential to reducing the cold-war stockpile of nuclear weapons that** **continue to threaten humanity.** Flexibility is critical to any alliance. Despite the strategic importance of a relationship with Russia, Republicans have signaled that any compromise on the issue of the missile defense system will be a non-starter if they gain control of the White House and Capitol Hill. The initial criticisms of Obama’s comments went something like this: “What plans are he formulating, that make his “last election” relevant? What is he planning to do that, if the American people were aware of it, would make him unelectable?” While the initial responses to Obama’s comments were purely motivated by November’s elections, Mitt Romney’s remarks went much further. Romney called Russia America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” While you could argue that this is another etch-a-sketch moment, Romney’s comments show a complete disregard for any U.S.-Russian alliance. Romney’s comments are particularly important because he is the most likely to succeed Obama in the fall. His comments have signaled to the world that Republicans don’t necessarily believe that any alliance exists in the first place. This gives Russia free reign to take more hardline positions on nuclear proliferation issues. While Romney’s comments were clearly motivated by election year politics, they also indicate that the party has not escaped Cold War thinking, an approach that says any compromise with Russia is tantamount to weakening America’s strategic position. Until that mindset is broken, global security will continue to be undermined by an increasingly hostile Kremlin.

### 1nc—dod cp

#### The United States Department of Defense should acquire, via alternative financing, small modular reactors to provide electricity for military installations in the United States.

DOD leadership catalyzes SMR development and spills over to commercialization---they empirically overcome tech barriers

Andres and Breetz 11 Richard B, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University and Hanna L, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February, "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications", www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

The preceding analysis suggests that **DOD should** seriously consider **taking a leadership role on small reactors**. This new technology has the potential to solve two of the most serious energy-related problems faced by the department today. Small reactors could island domestic military bases and nearby communities, thereby protecting them from grid outages. They could also drastically reduce the need for the highly vulnerable fuel convoys used to supply forward operating bases abroad. ¶ The technology being proposed for small reactors (much of which was originally developed in U.S. Government labs) is promising. A number of the planned designs are self-contained and highly mobile, and could meet the needs of either domestic or forward bases. Some promise to be virtually impervious to accidents, with design characteristics that might allow them to be used even in active operational environments. These reactors are potentially safer than conventional light water reactors. The argument that this technology could be useful at domestic bases is virtually unassailable. The argument for using this technology in operational units abroad is less conclusive; however, because of its potential to save lives, it warrants serious investigation.¶ Unfortunately, the technology for these reactors is, for the most part, caught between the drawing board and production. Claims regarding the field utility and safety of various reactors are plausible, but authoritative evaluation will require substantial investment and technology demonstration. **In the U.S. market, DOD could play an important role** in this area. In the event that the U.S. small reactor industry succeeds without DOD support, the types of designs that emerge might not be useful for the department since some of the larger, more efficient designs that have greater appeal to private industry would not fit the department’s needs. Thus, there is significant incentive for DOD to intervene to provide a market, both to help the industry survive and to shape its direction.¶ **Since the 1970s, in the U**nited **S**tates, only the military **has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors**. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well. If DOD leads as a first mover in this market—initially by providing analysis of costs, staffing, reactor lines, and security, and, when possible, by moving forward with a pilot installation—the new technology will likely survive and be applicable to DOD needs**. If DOD does not, it is possible the technology will be unavailable in the future for either U.S. military or commercial use.**

#### DOD clean energy investment avoids politics---but the plan’s controversial

Appelbaum 12 Binyamin, Defense cuts would hurt scientific R&D, experts say, The New York Times, 1-8, http://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/defense-cuts-would-hurt-scientific-rd-experts-say

Sarewitz, who studies the government's role in promoting innovation, said the Defense Department had been more successful than other federal agencies because it is the main user of the innovations that it finances. The Pentagon, which spends billions each year on weapons, equipment and technology, has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects.¶ "The central thing that distinguishes them from other agencies is that they are the customer," Sarewitz said. "You can't pull the wool over their eyes."¶ Another factor is the Pentagon's relative insulation from politics, which has allowed it to sustain a long-term research agenda in controversial areas**.** No matter which party is in power, the Pentagon has continued to invest in clean-energy technology, for example, in an effort to find ways to reduce one of its largest budget items, energy costs.

### 1nc—politics da

#### **Fiscal cliff will pass**

Schroeder 10/25 Robert is a writer for the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch. “Of 5 ‘fiscal cliff’ outcomes only 1 is disaster,” 2012, <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/five-fiscal-cliff-scenarios-2012-10-25>

Meet in the middle : President Obama and congressional Republicans haven’t exactly been in compromising moods this election season, but **the signs are there for a deal that makes both sides somewhat happy**. Obama may have tipped his hand in the last debate with Romney when he said flatly that the defense cuts “will not happen” (though the campaign later walked that statement back). Moreover, Vice President Joe Biden’s repeated use of a $1 million threshold for higher tax rates in his own debate with Paul Ryan suggested wiggle room on the revenue side of the cliff. If Romney wins on Nov. 6, he may ask Congress to come up with new deficit-reduction ideas. But if Obama prevails? “We believe the Republicans are likely to give in eventually on raising revenues from upper-income tax payers,” said the Barclays analysts in their Oct. 23 note.¶ Grand bargain : In an Oct. 23 interview with the Des Moines Register, Obama predicted he and Republicans would come to the equivalent of the “grand bargain” he has been trying to work out with the GOP. That translates to $4 trillion of deficit reduction over 10 years. Yet even if a reelected Obama and lame-duck Congress can begin to forge a medium- or long-term deal addressing taxes and spending, he apparently doesn’t believe it can be done before the end of the year. “We’re going to be in a position where I believe in the first six months we are going to solve that big piece of business,” Obama said.

#### Pushing military energy initiatives poisons the well for fiscal cliff negotiations---the link’s unique because green military spending’s been cut

Jeff Sorenson 9-28, a retired lieutenant general (U.S. Army), is a vice president and partner in A.T. Kearney's defense practice and a former U.S. Army chief information officer, 9/28/12, “Saving energy, saving soldiers' lives,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/259163-saving-energy-saving-soldiers-lives

From biofuels that could propel the Navy’s Great Green Fleet to spending billions of dollars on renewable energy, the Pentagon’s green energy initiatives have emerged as a contentious topic in Washington. Recent Congressional budget proposals could curtail military efforts to produce alternative fuels because they are currently more expensive than fossil fuels. Yet Pentagon officials insist its focus on energy conservation and renewable energy is essential for national security and improved military capability.

Who’s right? Is the Pentagon’s pursuit of green energy an outrageously expensive endeavor or an operational necessity? Yes, the impending concerns about a potential $259 billion budget reduction for the Defense Department over the next five years might make one question the fiscal sense of investing billions on renewable energy projects.

#### Obama’s capital is key

Sprung 9/21 Andrew Sprung is a political commentator & media consultant. He is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor. “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," 2012, http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html

Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance. But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support. Obama also **used the bully pulpit at crucial points**, if not to rally public opinion, at least **to re-commit wavering Democrats -**- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a **good faith negotiator**, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals. In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. Savvy politicians channel public opinion; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he **amassed the political capital**, and he spent it, and we got what he paid for. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey: But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered. Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said: I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message. So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes. Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts. First, he **understates Obama's** (and the Democrats') **successes in the year of confrontation** that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, **it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition.** Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced" approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. **But that battle ain't over yet**, and popular support for Obama's position **is political capital that's still in the bank**. In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama, if he wins reelection, will have the whip hand**,** given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes **banked him further capital in this upcoming fight**. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side. Third, it's rational for Obama to recast his bid for change in election season, because of course he's seeking further "change" from the outside, i.e., more Democrats elected to Congress. He's not going to win a mandate as in 2008, or, most likely, majorities in both houses of Congress. But he has to make the pitch for being granted renewed tools to advance his agenda. Finally, a key part of Obama's "you are the change" pitch in his convention speech was a frank call to play defense -- to protect the changes wrought in his first term and fend off the further capture of the electoral process and the nation's resources by the oligarchy the GOP represents: If you turn away now – if you buy into the cynicism that the change we fought for isn’t possible … well, change will not happen. If you give up on the idea that your voice can make a difference, then other voices will fill the void: lobbyists and special interests; the people with the $10 million checks who are trying to buy this election and those who are making it harder for you to vote; Washington politicians who want to decide who you can marry, or control health-care choices that women should make for themselves.

#### Going over the fiscal cliff causes a second great depression

Morici 8/7 Peter, PhD, is a "recognized expert on economic policy and international economics." He is a Professor of International Business at the R.H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. "Fix fiscal cliff now or face next Great Depression," 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/07/fix-fiscal-cliff-now-or-face-next-great-depression/

President Obama and Republicans are engaging in dangerous brinksmanship. Putting off a political solution to the looming “fiscal cliff” until after the election **risks a** second Great Depression.¶ Without a compromise by January, $400 billion in mandatory spending cuts and more than $100 billion in tax increases will immediately go into effect. **With our economy only growing by only $300 billion annually, such a shock would thrust it into a prolonged contraction.**

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 1nc prolif adv

#### The global nuclear renaissance will spread enrichment capabilities worldwide---but developing and exporting SMRs prevents states from acquiring the full fuel cycle

Anatoly S. Diyakov 10, Professor of Physics and Director of the Center for Arms Control Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics, Winter 2010, “The nuclear “renaissance” & preventing the spread of enrichment & reprocessing technologies: a Russian view”, Dædalus, Vol. 139, No. 1

The anticipated growth of nuclear power around the world may lead to the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies as well. The expectations associated with a renewed interest in nuclear power and the rate of nuclear power growth in the world may be exaggerated; at the very least we can expect that the growth would occur not immediately, but over a long period. Nevertheless, there are definite concerns about the implications of nuclear power expansion for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Driving these concerns is a sense that, beyond interest in nuclear power, developing countries also have an interest in retaining their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt) to possess nuclear fuel cycle technologies. A potential spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies, especially technologies for uranium enrichment and for reprocessing spent fuel to separate plutonium, poses a serious concern to the nuclear nonproliferation regime because enrichment and reprocessing capabilities give states the capability to produce fissile materials for weapons.

This is not a new problem. Indeed, as early as 1946, the Acheson-Lillenthal report declared that proliferation risks are inherent to the nuclear fuel cycle. If nations engage in fuel cycle activities it increases the risk of:

• Spread of sensitive technologies from declared facilities, resulting in their illegal transfer to other entities;

• Diversion of nuclear materials from declared fuel cycle facilities;

• Running a military program at undeclared fuel cycle facilities; and

• Breakout–that is, withdrawal from the npt and the subsequent use of safeguarded nuclear facilities for military purposes.

The reality of these dangers was recently demonstrated by North Korea and the A.Q. Khan network. International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has said that the fuel cycle is the “Achilles heel” of the nonproliferation system.8

Some countries have already declared their right to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies. This right is in fact secured for countries party to the npt. The npt does not restrict peaceful development and use of nuclear power; Article IV of the Treaty asserts, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”

However, in ensuring the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, the npt also imposes specific obligations upon its member states. In accordance with Article II of the npt, “Each non-nuclearweapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. ” Article III requires that each Treaty participant state “undertakes to accept safeguards . . . for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.”

The right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, afforded by the npt, is considered by some to be a loophole in the nonproliferation regime. This loophole, and recent violations of commonly accepted obligations by certain countries, raises questions about the npt’s capacity to protect international security adequately from threats that may occur.

It would be wrong to blame the authors of the npt for this loophole. Over the four decades that have passed since the npt first came into effect, the world has changed dramatically. The npt to a large extent was initially intended to prevent creation of nuclear weapons by industrially advanced countries such as West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan, and others, while simultaneously providing them the bene½t of peaceful nuclear use and security guarantees. When the npt was being negotiated in the 1960s, hardly anyone could have imagined that, with time, the main actors in proliferation and the dangers arising from it would come to be those countries that had recently become liberated from Europe’s colonial dominion (at the time called “developing” or “third-world” countries) and also non-state entities– namely, terrorist organizations.

Considering that objective forces are compelling more and more countries to turn to nuclear energy to satisfy their energy needs, and that they have the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, it is necessary to search for solutions that, on the one hand, would prevent proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies and, on the other hand, would ensure interested countries guaranteed access to external sources of nuclear fuel cycle services and products.

In light of the expected broad utilization of nuclear power, the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime should be sought in two ways. One way presupposes that states abandon plans to acquire uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies if they do not possess them already. However, this proposal has practically no chance to be realized, at least not in the near future. Furthermore, attempts to implement it at present would be counterproductive to strengthening the nonproliferation regime, since it would require amending the npt. In other words, the npt would have to be “reopened,” and another discriminatory division among npt member states–countries permitted to have the nuclear fuel cycle and those not– would have to be created in addition to the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapons countries division that already exists. Considering the unwillingness on the part of most non-nuclear states to undertake additional restrictions, it is dif½- cult to expect that the negotiations process, involving participation from all 140 npt member states, would be successful. Many countries believe that restrictions on development of technologies should be universal for all npt participant states, and should not permit some to develop technologies while prohibiting others. For example, Canada has no enrichment plants at present, although it is considering the possibility of creating an enrichment facility for production of low-enriched uranium for its candu reactors. Brazil, which does have an active enrichment program, would be permitted to have it. Efforts to create and enforce this further division would do more to weaken the npt than it would to strengthen it. As the example of Iran shows, additional division of states into those permitted to have enrichment and reprocessing and those forbidden not only undermines the unity of npt member countries, but also facilitates development of a black market for nuclear technologies.

The second way to strengthen the regime entails switching to innovative nuclear power technologies that could sustain the nonproliferation regime by means of inherent physical and technological properties. This would require development of new types of power reactors and the fuel cycles for them. To this end, work is presently being conducted through a number of international programs, including the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (inpro), Generation IV, and gnep+anfc. However, progress has been slow in these programs, and the possibilities for the creation and use of such innovative nuclear technologies lie in the distant future. Therefore, the expansion of nuclear power in the world, even if started by 2020 to 2025, will be based on the use of light water reactors and existing fuel cycle technologies. Taking into account the current trend toward increasing the operational lifetime of nuclear power reactors up to 60 or 70 years, it becomes obvious that there is a need to ½nd such solutions that could work during a period of at least a century.

#### U.S.-exported SMRs replace indigenous enrichment capability---they’re black-boxed

ITA 11 – International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 2011, “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf

Another potential long-term strength of SMRs is that some designs could also support nuclear non-proliferation objectives. All U.S. SMRs are designed to be deployed in an underground configuration. Industry observers contend that this would limit the risk for aboveground sabotage (which is a serious consideration for traditional nuclear power plants) or for radioactive release. The fuel cycle (particularly uranium enrichment and reprocessing) is where most non-proliferation concerns lie. The U.S. SMRs likely to be deployed in the near term are similarly fueled as the existing LWRs, but some U.S. vendors argue that the United States could exercise greater influence in the global nuclear fuel trade if U.S. SMR technology were widely deployed.

Some U.S. SMR vendors claim that their designs could be “black boxed” (that is, they could be deployed already fueled), and once the fuel is spent, the entire unit could be shipped back to the factory for waste handling and reprocessing. If the responsibility for the fuel cycle is taken out of the hands of the reactor operator, then risks of proliferation could potentially be reduced. Significant technical issues, however, remain unsolved for this concept, and there are serious outstanding questions involving transportation, waste handling, safety, and security. Although an attractive idea, such designs are unlikely to be deployed in the near or mid term.

#### Global expansion of enrichment capability is the only way nuclear power can offset enough carbon emissions to solve climate change

Sharon Squassoni 9, Director and Senior Fellow of the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS, 3/25/9, “Nuclear Power: How Much More?,” http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=176&rid=2

The amount of nuclear capacity required to make a signification contribution to global climate change mitigation is so large that it would inevitably be widely distributed across the globe. Such a distribution would have particular implications for nuclear proliferation. However, projected distributions of nuclear energy out to 2050 are extremely speculative. The industry itself does not engage in such projections, and countries that set nuclear energy production goals have a history of widely missing long-range targets, such as China and India. The discussion below considers a hypothetical distribution of nuclear energy for 2050, based on the 2003 MIT Study. [12]

Scenario III, shown in Figure 7, uses the “High 2050” scenario in Appendix 2 (“Global Electricity Demand and the Nuclear Power Growth Scenario”) of the 2003 MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power. Although this is not a distribution designed to achieve optimal CO2 reductions, it is expansion at a level significant enough (1500 GWe) to have an effect on CO2 emissions. This would mean a fourfold increase from current reactor capacity.

The MIT study used an underlying assumption that the developed countries would continue with a modest annual increase in per capita electricity use and the developing countries would move to the 4000 kWh per person per year benchmark if at all feasible (the 4000 kWh benchmark being the dividing line between developed and advanced countries). Electricity demand was then pegged to estimated population growth. Finally, it was assumed that nuclear energy would retain or increase its current share of electricity generation. The least-off developing countries were assumed in the MIT study not to have the wherewithal for nuclear energy. It should be noted that MIT’s 2050 projection was “an attempt to understand what the distribution of nuclear power deployment would be if robust growth were realized, perhaps driven by a broad commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and a concurrent resolution of the various challenges confronting nuclear power’s acceptance in various countries.” A few countries that the MIT High 2050 case included but are not included here are countries that currently have laws restricting nuclear energy, such as Austria.

Implications for Uranium Enrichment

A fourfold expansion of nuclear energy would entail significant new production requirements for uranium enrichment as shown in Figure 8 and possibly, reprocessing. The MIT study anticipated that 54 states would have reactor capacities that could possibly justify indigenous uranium enrichment. If a capability of 10 GWe is considered the threshold at which indigenous enrichment becomes cost-effective, more than 15 additional states could find it advantageous to engage in uranium enrichment.

Figure 9 depicts what the geographic distribution of enrichment capacity might look like, based on the development of 10 GWe or more of reactor capacity. Of course, some states – such as Australia or Kazakhstan – might opt to enrich uranium regardless of domestic nuclear energy capacity, choosing to add value to their own uranium exports. In addition, states may choose to take the path of the UAE, which has formally renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing in its domestic law, despite aspiring to reach 10 GWe of capacity. Ultimately, these decisions lie very much in the political realm, and can be reversed.

#### Extinction

Flournoy 12 – Citing Feng Hsu, PhdD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center, Don FLournoy, PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for Unviersity/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

#### Plan causes massive IAEA overstretch---only SMRs link---turns prolif

Dr. Edwin Lyman 11, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf

The distributed deployment of small reactors would also put great strains on existing licensing and inspection resources. Nuclear reactors are qualitatively different from other types of generating facilities, not least because they require a much more extensive safety and security inspection regime. Similarly, deployment of individual small reactors at widely distributed and remote sites around the world would strain the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its ability to adequately safeguard reactors to guard against proliferation, since IAEA inspectors would need to visit many more locations per installed megawatt around the world. Maintaining robust oversight over vast networks of SMRs around the world would be difficult, if feasible at all.

#### Lack of effective inspections turns the whole case---makes SMRs worse for prolif, safety and security than large reactors

Dr. Edwin Lyman 11, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors,” <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf>

Proponents of small modular reactors (SMRs) claim that their designs have inherent safety features compared to large reactors, and some even argue that their reactors would have been able to withstand an event as severe as Fukushima. We find these claims to be unpersuasive. For any plant, large or small, the key factor is the most severe event that the plant is designed to withstand—the so-called maximum “design-basis” event. Unless nuclear safety requirements for new reactors are significantly strengthened, one cannot expect that either small or large reactors will be able to survive a beyond-design-basis event like Fukushima. Although some light-water SMR concepts may have desirable safety chara

#### No rapid prolif---dangerous states are terrible at proliferating

Jacques E.C. Hymans 12, Assistant Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, 4/16/12, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/134657

The dismal failure of North Korea's April 13 long-range missile test -- it broke into pieces after 81 seconds [1] of flight time -- has also exposed the poverty of standard proliferation analyses. In the days leading up to the test, most commentators apparently took Pyongyang's technological forward march for granted. Even the more sober voices [2] evinced little doubt that this test would go at least as well as the country's 2009 effort, which managed to put a rocket into flight for about fifteen minutes before it malfunctioned. Meanwhile, other technical experts regaled readers with tales of the "emerging" [3] bona fide North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile [4]force, which might soon be able to target the continental United States. And there were renewed calls for the United States and its East Asian allies to embrace the "Israeli option" [5]: pre-emptive military strikes against North Korean strategic weapons facilities. The actual results of the test, however, demonstrate that the analysts' nightmare scenarios were hardly more credible than North Korea's own propaganda volleys.

To be sure, a single technical failure need not condemn an entire strategic weapons program. Pyongyang's missile mishap, however, was not a lone failure; it was merely the latest in a long line of botched strategic weapons tests. The country's long-range missile test record [7] is frankly pathetic: a total failure in 2006, a partial failure in 2009, and a total failure in 2012. (A 1998 test of a medium-range missile that had been jerry-rigged to fly a longer distance was also a partial failure.) And its nuclear test record is almost as bad: a virtual fizzle [8] in 2006, and a very modest blast at best [9] in 2009.

Amazingly, the assumption that Pyongyang already owns the very weapons that it has consistently failed to demonstrate has long driven U.S. policy. The Clinton administration's North Korea diplomacy was based on the belief that there was a "better than even chance" [10] that Pyongyang had built the bomb. The George W. Bush administration then ripped up the Clinton-era policy because it thought that the North Koreans had cheated [11] and built even more bombs than Clinton realized. Most recently, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has gone so far as to state that "we know" [12] that Pyongyang possesses "between one and six nuclear weapons," creating the impression that new leader Kim Jong Un could give the order to take out Seoul or Tokyo at any time. Given Washington's blind certainty about the North Korean menace, it is little wonder that few analysts anticipated its latest belly flop.

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted [13] that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb [14]" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

### 1nc water wars adv

#### Status quo solves and nuclear desalination is ineffective

Gar Smith 11, Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, a former editor of Common Ground magazine, a Project Censored Award-winning journalist, and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War, "NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE," June, International Forum on Globalization series focused on False Solutions, http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear\_Roulette\_book.pdf

By 2025, 3.5 billion people will face severe fresh-water shortages. Nuclear proponents groping for justifications to expand nuclear power have argued that the waste heat from power plants can provide a “cheap and clean” solution to the inherently costly process of removing salt from seawater. Desalination plants (there are 13,080 worldwide, mostly oil- and gas-fired and mostly in wealthy desert nations) already produce more than 12 billion gallons of drinkable water a day. 153 The first nuclear desalinator was installed in Japan in the late 1970s and scores of reactor-heated desalination plants are operating around the world today.¶ But **nuclear desalination is another False Solution**. The problem with atomic water-purifiers is that using heat to treat seawater is an obsolete 20 th -century technology. Thermal desalination has given way to new reverse osmosis systems that are less energy intensive and 33 times cheaper to operate. 154 Nuclear desalination advocates claim that wind, solar, and wave power aren’t up to the task while new low-temperature evaporation technology may be able to produce high purity water at temperatures as low as 122° Fahrenheit. 155 Promoting reactors as a solution to the world’s water shortage is especially ludicrous since nuclear power plants consume more water than any other energy source. 156¶ Even proponents admit there is a potential risk that running seawater through a radioactive environment might contaminate the drinking water produced. 157 Undeterred, scientists in Russia and India have proposed anchoring small atom-powered water-plants offshore near densely populated coastal cities. But this would provide no relief for the billions of people living inland in water-starved regions of North Africa and Asia.¶ Desalination is merely a way of giving a marginal new purpose to existing reactors whose balance sheets would be improved if they were retrofitted with desalination chambers. As with power generation, so with desalination: efficiency in water use (better irrigation technology, crop selection, eliminating transit losses, etc.) beats new production.¶ A real solution to the growing global water shortage needs to address the increasing amount of water diverted to wasteful agricultural and industrial practices and concentrate on preventing the water from being contaminated in the first place—by, among other things, capping the size of local populations to match locally available water supplies.

#### The U.S. isn’t key to any global SMRs

Kate Anderson 10, Senior Engineer in the Integrated Applications Office, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2/1/10, “SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS,” https://smr.inl.gov/Document.ashx?path=DOCS%2FReading+Room%2Fgeneral%2FNuclear+White+Paper+by+NREL+020110.pdf

Small nuclear reactors are not currently commercially available, but they present a potential future energy generation technology that offers constant baseload power with no greenhouse gas emissions. Small nuclear power reactors range in size from 10-300 MW, compared to traditional nuclear reactors that are greater than 1000 MW. Over fifty small nuclear reactor designs are in development by universities, national laboratories, and private companies around the world. They are based on a diverse set of technologies including traditional light water reactors, as well as newer gas, liquid metal, and molten salt cooled technologies2. Potential applications include:

 Providing power in remote areas, where the cost of building transmission lines is high

 Providing power in developing countries, where smaller transmission systems can’t handle large reactors or the capital cost of large reactors is too high

 Powering energy-intensive industrial users, like mining or oil and gas, that need a constant supply of on-site power

 Providing a grid-independent source of power to military bases, to reduce vulnerability to grid disruption

 Providing power for smaller grids (municipal utilities, small cities)

 Providing incremental power expansion for large utilities

#### No water wars

Katz 11—Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University. PhD (David, Hydro-Political Hyperbole, Global Environmental Politics, 11; 1; Feb 2011)

A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were [End Page 15] more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conflict.30

Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efficiency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33

Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce, 34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efficiency—rendering water less scarce, not more so.

Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conflict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also find that armed conflict over water resources has been uncommon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conflict, both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature.

Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under fire. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies find correlations between water-related variables and conflict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international conflict, 38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies [End Page 16] that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do find correlations between water and conflict are either not robust or are contrasted by other findings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal find that the statistical significance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity “are weak, negligible or insignificant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch find that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict, but found no correlation between conflict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous.”42

#### No risk of water wars---historical evidence all concludes neg---cooperation is way more likely and solves

Jeremy Allouche 11 is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse

Water/food resources, war and conflict

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological changeand greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture**.** More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an **instrumental purpose**; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none **of these declarations have been followed up by military action**.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None **of the** various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, **more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale** (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however **no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict**. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity **does not make much sense in the light of the recent** historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, **the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin** ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

#### Effects of water scarcity in Central Asia are long-term—cooperation in the interim solves any risk of conflict

Thomas Bernauer and Tobias Siegfried 12, professor of political science at ETH Zurich, his research group is based at the Center for Comparative and International Studies AND adjunct assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and a fellow at the Earth Institute, "Climate change and international water conflict in Central Asia," January, Journal of Peace Research Vol. 49, Issue 1, Sage Journals

Conclusions¶ In this article we have engaged in a critical assessment of the neo-malthusian claim that climatic changes can be an important source of international tensions, in the extreme even militarized interstate disputes. The most likely scenarios are international disputes over transboundary waters. Existing event datasets on international river basin conflict and cooperation indicate that international disputes over water issues are quite common. But none of these disputes has thus far escalated into a militarized interstate dispute in a form that would, according to common definitions, qualify as a war. Nonetheless, many observers expect that the outbreak of future militarized interstate disputes remains a strong possibility.¶ The strongest ‘candidates’ in this respect are international catchments shared by poorer, less democratic, and politically less stable countries, governed by weak international water management institutions and exposed to severe climatic changes. Since the Syr Darya corresponds quite well to these characteristics, it is a critical test case. If the neo-malthusian specter of militarized interstate disputes over water is empirically relevant, we should see signs of it in the Syr Darya. Hence we have studied, ex post, international water allocation problems and institutions in the Syr Darya and, ex ante, whether climatic changes are likely to make existing international tensions worse in future.¶ Based on hydrological data and other information, we have found that the currently existing international water management institution in the Syr Darya has failed. Using a coupled climate, land-ice, and rainfall-runoff model for the Syr Darya, we have then examined whether, in the absence of an effective water allocation mechanism in this international catchment, climate change is likely to make existing international tensions worse. The biggest concern in this respect is Kyrgyz– Uzbek relations, which could deteriorate further because the Uzbek population and agriculture in the Syr Darya catchment are particularly vulnerable to climate change-induced shifts in runoff. We conclude, however, that such shifts are likely to occur only in the medium to long term. This leaves some time for the riparian countries to set up an effective international framework for water allocation and prevention of climate changeinduced geohazards. By implication, our findings suggest that a climate change-induced **militarized interstate dispute over water resources in Central Asia is unlikely**.

#### Indus Waters Treaty solves

Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M. Stinnett 12, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia AND assistant professor of international affairs in UGA's School of Public &. International Affairs, "Weathering climate change: Can institutions mitigate international water conflict?" January, Vol. 49, Issue 1, Sage Journals

Conflict management¶ To cope with disagreements among signatories, some river treaties specify a variety of formal procedures for dispute management. The Permanent Indus Commission, for example, is responsible for resolving disputes between India and Pakistan over the implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Disputes are managed primarily through regular meetings of the officials that make up the two national sections of the Commission (Zawahri, 2009b). At the opposite end of the spectrum lie mandates for binding arbitration or adjudication by an existing international institution. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have resorted to the ICJ to resolve a dispute involving a 1977 treaty governing water infrastructure projects on the Danube (McCaffrey, 2003).¶ Dispute resolution provisions can address different sources of noncompliance, including those related to anticipated consequences of climate change. A formal process of resolving disputes can address overt cheating by raising the visibility of noncompliance (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). By increasing the costs of violations – some of which may appear particularly tempting due to the effects of climate change (e.g. unilaterally increase withdrawal rates to compensate for lack of water due to a number of dry years) – dispute settlement mechanisms can improve compliance.¶ Conflict management institutions can also address disputes over an agreement’s exact obligations. If climate change causes changes to a river system that were not envisioned at the time of the treaty signing, such as lower flow or greater seasonal variation, then these conditions will make the treaty less effective and increase the risk of conflict. In these circumstances, provisions in a treaty for dealing with unforeseen conditions will become important for preventing conflict. The rulings of a third-party arbitration panel, court, or even informal mediation through a secretariat or intergovernmental body can clarify the terms of a treaty (Chayes & Chayes, 1995). This enhances compliance by limiting the occurrence of unintended violations that result from treaty ambiguities or changed circumstances.

#### No Middle East water wars

Urdan 11—writer for Inside Government (Matthew, Wars or Water Peace? Part I, 28 Feb 11, http://www.insidegov.org/?p=534)

Perhaps the “Goldilocks Zone of Cooperation” in terms of water scarcity represents a unique period in human history and global civilization evolution when practical considerations, that may be representative of constructivist thought, will allow the transformation of society into a truly global civilization capable of finding solutions to the most pressing of global issues before it is too late and a perpetual Hobbesian state of war ensues. The water situations and interdependencies on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq (Dinar, 2009); along with the enduring Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan that persists despite serious disputes over territory in Kashmir strongly illustrate this idea. (Sahni, 2006).

“The Indus Waters Treaty set a precedent of cooperation between India and Pakistan that has survived three wars and other hostilities between the two nations…. As Stephen P. Cohen has observed, ‘The Indus Waters Treaty is a model for future regional cooperation, especially on energy, environmental concerns, and even the management of the region’s impressive water resources.’” (Sahni, 2006, p. 154).

That India and Pakistan continue to honor and abide by the IWT is impressive, but perhaps it pales in comparison to water cooperation in the Middle East. Contrary to realist theory that would predict water wars, water cooperation in the Middle East is the norm. Allan explains that the

“Middle East is the most water-challenged region in the world, with little freshwater and negligible soil water. Water is therefore a key strategic natural resource, and realist theory, as well as popular intuition, has it that the scarcity of water in the region will lead to water wars. Despite growing water demand, the Middle East has shown no signs of a water war since some minor military events in the northern Jordan Valley in the early 1960s. On the contrary, there is much evidence of cooperation over scarce water resources in the region, especially in the Jordan River Basin, where freshwater is scarcest.” (Allan, 2002, pp. 255-256).

# 2NC

## DOD CP

### AT: Perm---Do Both---2NC

#### The permutation and plan don’t solve prolif---only the DOD being the sole first mover guarantees U.S. companies lead SMR development---otherwise it’ll be dominated by foreign-owned firms

Andres and Breetz 11 Richard B, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University and Hanna L, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February, "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications", www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that expertise in small reactors could become dominated by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy technology with small, distributed power reactors. 38 Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there are scores of competing designs under development from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there is a chance that the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.

Along with other negative consequences, the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, and proliferation resistance.

### DOD CP---Solves the Case---Commercialization/Spillover---2NC

#### The CP is comparatively more effective than the plan---SMRs have an absolute requirement for more R&D that only government financial support solves---DOD needs an explicit strategy

Matt Stepp et al. 11, specialist in clean energy innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, formerly Fellow at the Breakthrough Institute, et al, May 2011, “Ten Principles for Creating a New U.S. Clean Energy Policy,” http://www.itif.org/files/2011-guiding-principles.pdf

R&D is fundamentally the most important part of an effective clean energy innovation policy. But by itself it is not enough. Spurring clean energy innovation means supporting innovation from the back-end (basic science and R&D) through the front-end (testing, demonstration, deployment, and commercialization). Clean energy policy should support a robust innovation system from beginning to end, ensuring that all stages of technology development are optimally sustained.

Clean energy innovation includes bridging technologies across the “valleys of death.” The first valley of death – the phase in development between R&D and prototyping the first generation of a technology – is crucially important because it takes the innovation out of the lab and proves its commercial viability. But building the first prototype of a radically new solar installation or demonstrating a new small modular nuclear reactor is capital intensive and risky. Because of this, the private sector has historically provided little support for this stage of development and would rather wait until new technologies yield a higher rate of return. So the federal government has played a significant role in developing many of the last century’s breakthrough technologies through demonstration and test-bed projects. Past breakthrough technologies like the Internet, nuclear power plants, and jet engines were initially built and tested at federal labs and through private sector collaborations with the military. Currently, the United States is just beginning to implement strategies for bridging technologies from the lab to demonstration, such as through the agreement between ARPA-E and the Department of Defense to test advanced energy technologies suitable for the militaries needs. But these policies are not permanent, as they are enforced at the agency level without a national strategy or Congressional mandate.

The second valley of death is the phase in development between tech demonstration and commercialization. 12 Clean energy must compete in an entrenched energy sector filled with significant institutional, political, and regulatory barriers to deployment. But it’s expensive to produce the first generation of technology after development and demonstration, making it a risky and potentially costly business decision for utilities and consumers. Clean energy may need up-front financing to build the first generation of new clean energy technologies and to hurdle barriers to deployment. Without it, the high cost of up-front investment is a significant deterrent for utilities to choose brand new advanced solar, wind, or small modular reactors (SMRs) over well established coal or natural gas plants. New clean energy is stuck in what Coalition for Green Capital’s Ken Berlin calls, “the chick and egg problem.” 13 Breakthrough clean energy needs first-generation investment after demonstration and testing in order to evolve into lower cost, better understood secondand third-generation tech. But utilities and consumers will only invest in breakthrough tech with greater cost and market certainty. The federal government can and should play a role in supporting this transition or what leading clean energy policy expert Bill Bonvillian calls “beefing up the back end of clean energy.” 14 This is different than simply subsidizing deployment of existing mature clean energy technologies with little hope for dramatic price reductions of next generation innovations.

#### No solvency deficits---SMR designs aren’t close to ready for licensing, so there’s no way removing licensing restrictions can be vital to solve the case---DOD lead-role primes the pump for the industry

Andres and Breetz 11 Richard B, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University and Hanna L, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February, "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications", www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

It should be emphasized that none of the small reactor designs currently under consideration for commercial development have been licensed by the NRC, let alone constructed, demonstrated, or tested. Given the early stage of the technology, **DOD’s “first mover” pursuit of small reactors could therefore have a profound influence on the** development of the **industry. DOD does have substantial experience** with nuclear energy—historically, both the U.S. Army and Navy have incorporated nuclear reactors into their operations6—**that could make it particularly well suited to taking a leading role in testing small reactors**.¶ The initial analysis offered in this paper suggests that small reactors could be **instrumental** in addressing DOD’s challenges of grid insecurity at domestic installations and fuel supply at forward operating bases. The next step is to conduct more fine-grained analysis to answer questions about costs, personnel needs, technological options, and security and transportability issues. The Secretary of Defense’s feasibility study and the research undertaken by the DOD/ DOE/NRC working group are crucial steps forward. We recommend that DOD continue to invest in research and analysis on small reactor options, with a goal of building a demonstration plant as soon as the technical, financial, and regulatory hurdles have been adequately resolved.

### DOD CP---Solves the Case---General/Licensing---2NC

#### DOD-purchased reactors are exempt from NRC licensing requirements---means none of their evidence about the current licensing framework gets close to applying to the CP---but, DOD procurement builds the necessary knowledge and operational experience for the NRC to license commercial reactors efficiently---means the CP solves the whole case

CSPO 10, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at ASU, “four policy principles for energy innovation & climate change: a synthesis”, June, <http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/Synthesis.pdf>

Government purchase of new technologies is a powerful way to accelerate innovation through increased demand (Principle 3a). We explore how this principle can be applied by considering how the DoD could purchase new nuclear reactor designs to meet electric power needs for DoD bases and operations. Small modular nuclear power reactors (SMRs), which generate less than 300 MW of power (as compared to more typical reactors built in the 1000 MW range) are often listed as a potentially transformative energy technology. While typical traditional large-scale nuclear power plants can cost five to eight billion dollars, smaller nuclear reactors could be developed at smaller scale, thus not presenting a “bet the company” financial risk. SMRs could potentially be mass manufactured as standardized modules and then delivered to sites, which could significantly reduce costs per unit of installed capacity as compared to today’s large scale conventional reactor designs. It is likely that some advanced reactors designs – including molten salt reactors and reactors utilizing thorium fuels – could be developed as SMRs. Each of these designs offers some combination of inherently safe operation, very little nuclear proliferation risk, relatively small nuclear waste management needs, very abundant domestic fuel resources, and high power densities – all of which are desirable attributes for significant expansion of nuclear energy. Currently, several corporations have been developing small nuclear reactors. Table 2 lists several of these companies and their reactor power capacities, as well as an indication of the other types of reactor innovations that are being incorporated into the designs. Some of these technologies depend on the well-established light water reactor, while others use higher energy neutrons, coolants capable of higher temperature operation, and other innovative approaches. Some of these companies, such as NuScale, intend to be able to connect as many as 24 different nuclear modules together to form one larger nuclear power plant. In addition to the different power ranges described in Table 2, these reactors vary greatly in size, some being only 3 to 6 feet on each side, while the NuScale reactor is 60 feet long and 14 feet in diameter. Further, many of these reactors produce significant amounts of high-temperature heat, which can be harnessed for process heating, gas turbine generators, and other operations. One major obstacle is to rapid commercialization and development are prolonged multi-year licensing times with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Currently, the NRC will not consider a reactor for licensing unless there is a power utility already prepared to purchase the device. Recent Senate legislation introduced by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) has pushed for DOE support in bringing down reactor costs and in helping to license and certify two reactor designs with the NRC. Some additional opportunities to facilitate the NRC licensing process for innovative small modular reactors would be to fund NRC to conduct participatory research to get ahead of potential license applications (this might require ~$100million/year) and potentially revise the current requirement that licensing fees cover nearly all NRC licensing review costs. One option for accelerating SMR development and commercialization, would be for DOD to establish SMR procurement specifications (to include cost) and agree to purchase a sufficient amount of SMR’s to underwrite private sector SMR development. Of note here may be that DARPA recently (3/30/10) issued a “Request for Information (RFI) on Deployable Reactor Technologies for Generating Power and Logistic Fuels”2 that specifies may features that would be highly desirable in an advanced commercial SMR. While other specifications including coproduction of mobility fuel are different than those of a commercial SMR power reactor, it is likely that a core reactor design meeting the DARPA inquiry specifications would be adaptable to commercial applications. While nuclear reactors purchased and used by DOD are potentially exempt from many NRC licensing requirements3, any reactor design resulting from a DOD procurement contract would need to proceed through NRC licensing before it could be commercially offered. Successful use of procured SMR’s for DOD purposes could provide the knowledge and operational experience needed to aid NRC licensing and it might be possible for the SMR contractor to begin licensing at some point in the SMR development process4. Potential purchase of small modular nuclear reactors would be a powerful but proven way in which government procurement of new energy technologies could encourage innovation. Public procurement of other renewable energy technologies could be similarly important.

#### Impossible for licensing to block the CP---NRC doesn’t have jurisdiction over DOD reactors

NEI 7 – Nuclear Energy Institute, March 2007, “The Nuclear Regulatory Process,” http://www.new.ans.org/standards/resources/toolkit/docs/nei-nuclear-regulatory-process-ans-posting1.pdf

The NRC does not have exclusive jurisdiction over all uses of nuclear material. The NRC does not license or regulate most uses of nuclear material by DOE or the Department of Defense; DOE’s production of nuclear material for military applications; or nuclear reactors used for defense (e.g., nuclear powered warships). While the NRC has jurisdiction over sources, it does not have jurisdiction over other discrete naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), such as radon, which is regulated by the states.

## Warming DA (on prolif)

### Warming Internal Link/AT: We Solve---2NC

#### a) The plan means nuclear energy for all but enrichment for very few---that makes solving warming impossible

Sharon **Squassoni**, senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment, former director of Policy Coordination in the Nonproliferation Bureau of the State Department, **2009**, “Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation?,” online: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear\_energy\_rebirth\_resuscitation.pdf

The discussion since 2004 within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) about new criteria to restrict enrichment and reprocessing transfers illustrates the pitfalls of an approach that promotes nuclear energy for all but only limited nuclear fuel cycles for most. President Bush suggested in February 2004 in a speech at the National Defense University that nuclear suppliers prohibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to states that did not already have those technologies. Since then, the NSG has discussed how to implement that prohibition. So far, several states have been unwilling to be relegated to the “havenot” category, including Canada, one of the largest suppliers of uranium ore. In fact, Canada may move quickly to establish an enrichment capability before the door closes. South Africa may resurrect the enrichment technique it developed for its weapons program or seek centrifuge enrichment technology. Ukraine sought cooperation with foreign partners “to obtain the full cycle of enrichment and production of nuclear fuel” to counter uncertain gas supplies from Russia, but Ukraine had agreed by the end of 2008 to join the Angarsk enrichment joint venture. Although NSG members already followed a policy of restraint on such transfers, the promise of major nuclear expansion appears to be eroding agreement in this area. Additional enrichment capacity in some of these states may not cause alarm, but if they are successful, it may become more difficult to justify why other states should not develop such capabilities.

In light of these difficulties, advanced states have been encouraging other states to voluntarily forswear enrichment and reprocessing as a confidence-building measure. In 2008, the United Arab Emirates released its Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy. Not coincidentally, the Emirates’ foreign minister and U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice signed a memorandum of understanding on peaceful nuclear cooperation the next day (followed by a cooperation agree ment several months later). The Emirates renounced any intention to develop a domestic enrichment and reprocessing capability and reportedly will pass legislation that would criminalize such activities within the country. The policy document cites economic infeasibility of such activities for a small nuclear fleet, international concerns about sensitive fuel cycle capabilities in developing countries, and the dual-use nature of components employed in fuel fabrication and processing. Instead, the Emirates will seek long-term arrangements with governments and contractors.

It is too soon to tell whether a significant number of states will follow in the United Arab Emirates’ footsteps. It is also unclear what consequences would ensue should the Emirates’ voluntary decisions be reversed. One suggestion by the State Department’s International Advisory Board was to reach agreement among suppliers that supply would be cut off if such voluntary decisions were reversed, and that consequences would be clearly spelled out in commercial contracts. This could be particularly difficult to implement. At the very least, such an approach depends on the success of extensive diplomatic negotiations.

Risks of Major Expansion

An expansion of nuclear power large enough to make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation—doubling, tripling, or quadrupling power reactor capacity—would present some of the risks described above, as well as new ones.

As long as light-water reactors remain the technology of choice, doubling or tripling the number of reactors will require more uranium enrichment plants. If all projected plans for power reactors by 2030 are realized, twice as much enriched uranium would need to be produced. Expansion according to climate change scenarios would require three to four times as much uranium enrichment capacity compared with today. If enrichment capabilities in the eleven countries that already enrich uranium were simply expanded, the risk of proliferation would not necessarily grow. But that is an unlikely scenario, given the lack of agreement among suppliers and recipients described above. Countries with significant uranium resources might choose to enrich for export (although the economics of this are not clear), and/or countries with more than ten reactors might find it economically feasible to enrich uranium for their own use. Under a 1,500-GWe capacity scenario, there could be fifteen additional countries that could have an economic justification for enriching their own uranium (with 10 GWe or more of nuclear capacity).

#### b) Solving warming requires quadrupling current reactor capacity---that’s Squassoni---that requires 4,000 reactors globally by mid-century

Nader Elhefnawy 8, Professor of English at the University of Miami, writer on IR published in journals including International Security, Astropolitics, and Survival, Autumn 2008, “The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation,” Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly

For nuclear energy to simply keep its position in the world’s energy portfolio, production equivalent to 800 of today’s reactors would be needed. The very reason, however, for much of the interest in nuclear energy is concern about the scarcity of fossil fuels, particularly oil, so it can be expected that nuclear energy will be called on to play a greater role than it has to date—at the very least, generating a larger share of the electricity the world uses. France currently gets 77 percent of its electricity through this medium. Were the entire world to follow a similar path, it would mean more than a quadrupling of output, with more than 2,000 reactors required to meet current needs, and between 3,000 and 4,000 reactors plausibly online by 2050. Were nuclear energy to become more important in areas where it has previously been marginalized, such as transportation—for instance, by powering fleets of electric vehicles or large-scale hydrogen fuel production—then the demand could rise even beyond current expectations, with one observer estimating that simply to compensate for an absence in fossil fuel production (rather than absolute decreases), some 5,000 to 6,000 reactors would be required by mid-century.5

#### c) Even under best case conditions like a carbon tax, the U.S. can only build 37 SMRs annually by 2030

David Solan et al 10, Assistant Professor of Public Policy & Administration and Director of the Energy Policy Institute at Boise State University, et al., June 2010, “Economic and Employment Impacts of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” http://epi.boisestate.edu/media/3494/economic%20and%20employment%20impacts%20of%20smrs.pdf

In the low SMR adoption case, there are only two to four SMRs manufactured in the U.S. each year between 2020 and 2030. In this case, the infrastructure to manufacture several SMRs per year in the U.S. may be too expensive to warrant the investment, so this "business-as-usual" case will not lead to a concerted SMR manufacturing effort in the U.S., if only the domestic market is considered.

Both the moderate and high SMR adoption cases assume that some greenhouse gas legislation is passed that penalizes C02 emissions. For these cases, the number of SMRs manufactured in the U.S. increases from 5 to 8 in 2020, to 31 to 37 in 2030. The total number of SMRs operating in the U.S. would increase from 4 to 14 in 2020, to 140 to 215 in 2030.

#### d) Solving warming requires almost 100 reactors a year---and requires several new states get enrichment capabilities

Sharon **Squassoni 8**, senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment, former director of Policy Coordination in the Nonproliferation Bureau of the State Department, March 12, 2008, “Nuclear Energy and Global Warming,” Testimony before the Committee on House Select Energy Independence and Global Warming, lexis

A rough approximation of where reactor capacity would expand **in a climate change scenario** is based on the high scenario of the 2003 MIT Study, "The Future of Nuclear Power." For 1500 GW capacity, MIT estimated that 54 countries (an additional 23) would have commercial nuclear power programs. This essentially **means a five- fold increase in the numbers of reactors worldwide** and an annual build rate of 35 per year. In the event that smaller-sized reactors are deployed in developing countries - which makes eminent sense - the numbers could be much higher. If nuclear energy were assumed to be able to **contribute a reduction of** between 2 and **6 billion tons of carbon per year** as outlined in the Stern Report, the resulting reactor capacity would range between 1800 GWe and 4500 GWe - increases ranging from six times to ten times current capacity. This would require building between 42 and 107 reactors per year through 2050.

Impact on Uranium Enrichment

Such increases in reactor capacity would certainly have repercussions for the front and back ends of the fuel cycle. Almost 90 percent of current operating reactors use low-enriched uranium (LEU). Presently, 11 countries have commercial uranium enrichment capacity and produce between 40 and 50 million SWU. A capacity of 1070 GWe - the one "wedge" scenario - could mean tripling enrichment capacity, requiring anywhere from 11 to 22 additional enrichment plants. A capacity of 1500 GWe would require quadrupling enrichment capacity (see slide 4). Further, if Stern Report nuclear expansion levels are achieved, enrichment capacity would have to increase ten-fold.

In assessing where new uranium enrichment capacity might develop, the MIT Study assumed that 18 states would have 10 GWe reactor capacity - the point at which domestic uranium enrichment becomes competitive with LEU sold on the international market - and thus might enrich uranium. (See slide 4 for a more modest approach, with 9 additional countries enriching uranium).

## Prolif adv

### 2nc – prolif resistant

#### SMRs that actually get deployed won’t be prolif-resistant---those design features are way off

ITA 11 – International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 2011, “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf

Some U.S. SMR vendors claim that their designs could be “black boxed” (that is, they could be deployed already fueled), and once the fuel is spent, the entire unit could be shipped back to the factory for waste handling and reprocessing. If the responsibility for the fuel cycle is taken out of the hands of the reactor operator, then risks of proliferation could potentially be reduced. Significant technical issues, however, remain unsolved for this concept, and there are serious outstanding questions involving transportation, waste handling, safety, and security. Although an attractive idea, such designs are unlikely to be deployed in the near or mid term.

### No Prolif---States Fail---2NC

#### New proliferants have an authoritarian management culture for their programs---ensures they fail

Jacques E.C. Hymans 12, Assistant Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 3

By contrast, most rulers of recent would-be nuclear states have tended to rely on a coercive, authoritarian management approach to advance their quest for the bomb, using appeals to scientists' greed and fear as the primary motivators. That coercive approach is a major mistake, because it produces a sense of alienation in the workers by removing their sense of professionalism. As a result, nuclear programs lose their way. Moreover, underneath these bad management choices lie bad management cultures. In developing states with inadequate civil service protections, every decision tends to become politicized, and state bureaucrats quickly learn to keep their heads down. Not even the highly technical matters faced by nuclear scientific and technical workers are safe from meddling politicians. The result is precisely the reverse of what the politicians intend: not heightened efficiency but rather a mixture of bureaucratic sloth, corruption, and endless blame shifting.

Although it is difficult to measure the quality of state institutions precisely, the historical record strongly indicates that the more a state has conformed to the professional management culture generally found in developed states, the less time it has needed to get its first bomb and the lower its chances of failure. Conversely, the more a state has conformed to the authoritarian management culture typically found in developing states, the more time it has needed to get its first bomb and the higher its chances of failure.

## Water Wars Adv

### 2NC Water Wars

#### Prefer our authors’ studies

Wendy Barnaby 9 is editor of People & Science, the magazine published by the British Science Association "Do nations go to war over water?" Nature 458, 282-283 (19 March 2009) www.nature.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/nature/journal/v458/n7236/full/458282a.html

Yet the myth of water wars persists. Climate change, we are told, will cause water shortages. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that up to 2 billion people may be at risk from increasing water stress by the 2050s, and that this number could rise to 3.2 billion by the 2080s7.

Water management will need to adapt. But the mechanisms of trade, international agreements and economic development that currently ease water shortages will persist. Researchers, such as Aaron Wolf at Oregon State University, Corvallis, and Nils Petter Gleditsch at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, point out that predictions of armed conflict come from the media and from popular, non-peer-reviewed work.

### No Escalation---Indo-Pak

#### War won’t go nuclear

Enders 2 (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely)

**\* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan**

**\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland**

**\* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council**

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

"Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."

The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.

"The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.

"Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said.

Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.

"India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."

Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.

"American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

# 1NR

## Elections DA

### Russia Relations – 2NC Impact Calculus

#### US-Russia relations key to solve extinction

Allison 11 (Graham, 10/30, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6)

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar [CTR] Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

#### Russia war outweighs – largest arsenals and most probable because of hair-trigger alert

Helfand and Pastore 9 | Presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility (Ira and John, MD's and Past Presidents of the Physicians for Social Responsbility, "US-Russia nuclear war still a threat," 3/31)

Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today. The nuclear danger will not pass until the U.S. and Russia lead the other nuclear states to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that seeks to abolish these weapons forever. As a critical first step the U.S. and Russia must take their weapons off ready-alert status. Presidents Obama and Medvedev can do this on their own by executive order.

#### Relations key to mediate India-Pakistan conflict

Oakley 99 (Robert, Kenneth Pollack, and James Przystup, National Defense University Press, 1999, “U.S.-Russian Partnership: Meeting the New Millennium”, online)

By working together, **the United States and Russia could** be much more effective in combating large-scale trafficking in narcotics and weapons—a source of concern to all but especially Russia. They could also **reduce regional politico-ethnic-religious tensions, including containing the pressures for Islamist radicalization** not only in Central Asia but **in Pakistan and Kashmir**. The United States and Russia could work with China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Central Asian states to build a solid regional front against efforts by Taliban or Arab extremists in Afghanistan to export their brand of Islam, to minimize any cross-border encouragement of extremist movements in neighboring states, and to clamp down on support for terrorist activities by Islamist groups in other countries including the Middle East and Africa, as well as South and Central Asia. This would require a diminution of tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, but close U.S.-Russian-Chinese cooperation could help encourage this. **The United States and Russia could also contribute to an overall reduction in tensions between Pakistan, India**, and China, **including restraint in weapon development and** deployment of **nuclear missiles**, a moratorium on production of fissile material and continued tight controls by India and Pakistan on proliferation of nuclear technology.

### Energy Key---Generic

#### Energy is the pivotal factor

LeVine 12 Steve LeVine is the author of The Oil and the Glory and a longtime foreign correspondent for Foreign Policy. “How dirty is Romney prepared to get to win election?” June 13, http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/12/how\_dirty\_is\_romney\_prepared\_to\_get\_to\_win\_election

Yet if the election is as close as the polls suggest, the energy ads could prove a pivotal factor. "Advertising is generally not decisive. Advertising matters at the margins. ... But ask Al Gore if the margin matters," said Ken Goldstein, president of the Campaign Media Analysis Group at Kantar Media. "This is looking like an election where the margin may matter."

### Russia Relations – XT Romney Kills Relations

#### Romney’s hostility toward Russia guarantees relations breakdown---collapses all gains of the reset and threatens global instability

Deyermond 10/1 Ruth Deyermond is Lecturer in War Studies in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. “The Republican Challenge to Obama’s Russia Policy,” Survival, Volume 54, Issue 5, 2012, Taylor and Francis

This changed radically at the start of of Barack Obama’s presidency in early 2009. The ‘reset’ of relations, announced by Vice President Joe Biden in February 2009, was notable for the prominence given Russia on the new foreign-policy agenda, and for its scope, with cooperation envisaged on a range of issues, including many that had been most problematic for relations during the previous administration.1 This reorientation of policy towards Russia has not been universally welcomed. **There is a high degree of hostility to the reset within the Republican Party** elite, who object both to individual policies within the overall framework and to the approach as a whole. The hardening partisan divide in US politics is helping to drive opposition to the reset, while the Republican Party’s increasingly conservative character appears to be contributing to the development of a consensus Republican view of the Russian state as an **aggressive, untrustworthy dictatorship** whose political organisation is antithetical to American values, and which threatens both US interests and international security. The return to the Russian presidency of Vladimir Putin, and the response of the White House, has reinforced these views.¶ With a Republican-controlled House of Representatives, and in the context of presidential and congressional elections, **this poses** significant risks **for the improved state of US–Russia relations,** even in the absence of any destabilising behaviour by the Russian government. Given the centrality of this bilateral relationship to global arms-reduction and non-proliferation regimes (including the prospects for resolving the crisis over Iranian nuclear development), to the management of multilateral institutions, and to European security, this is an issue of significant concern for those outside the borders of the United States as well as those within. The Obama administration’s reset is predicated on an acknowledgement that US–Russia relations had deteriorated to an extent that was damaging not only to American interests but to core aspects of the post- Cold War international system.¶ To be sure, Republican assessments of Russia are not wholly incorrect. Concerns about endemic corruption in the Russian state, for example, are clearly justified and widely shared. The difficulty with the Republican position is, rather, that it frequently appears to be driven by the partisan demands of US domestic politics, and that it is grounded in an **exaggerated** sense of **anxiety,** in which all aspects of the contemporary Russian state are seen as antithetical to American national interests and political values. This leads to a notably hostile approach, based on frequently exaggerated assessments of Russian behaviour and future intentions, of Russia as a threat to international security and, as Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney put it during the primary election campaign, as **the United States’ ‘number one geopolitical foe’.2** As the basis for US governmental thinking and policy about Russia in a Republican administration, what has emerged as the consensus position of **the Republican Party would** undo the fragile gains of the reset **and precipitate a return to the** unstable and potentially dangerous **character of US–Russia relations before 2009.** As the dominant view of Republicans in Congress it has the capacity to disrupt relations and halt further progress during a second Obama administration. Given the dynamics of the presidential election campaign, it also increases pressure on the current administration to adopt a more assertive, less cooperative posture towards Russia. There are some indications that this has in fact happened.

### At indistinct fp

#### Only Obama can maintain strong relations with Russia---consensus

Weir 12 Fred is a writer for the Christian Science Monitor. “Obama asks Russia to cut him slack until reelection,” 3/27, <http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2012/03/obama-asks-russia-cut-him-slack-until-reelection>

Russian experts say there's little doubt **the Kremlin would like to see Obama re-elected.** Official Moscow has been pleased by Obama's policy of "resetting" relations between Russia and the US, which resulted in the new START treaty and other cooperation breakthroughs after years of diplomatic chill while George W. Bush was president. The Russian media often covers Obama's lineup of Republican presidential challengers in tones of horror, and there seems to be a consensus among Russian pundits that a Republican president would put a quick end to the Obama-era thaw in relations. "The Republicans are active critics of Russia, and they are extremely negative toward Putin and his return to the presidency," says Dmitry Babich, a political columnist with the official RIA-Novosti news agency. "Democrats are perceived as more easygoing, more positive toward Russia and Putin." Speaking on the record in Seoul, Mr. Medvedev said the years since Obama came to power "were the best three years in the past decade of Russia-US relations.… I hope this mode of relations will maintain between the Russian Federation and the United States and between the leaders." During Putin's own election campaign, which produced a troubled victory earlier this month, he played heavily on anti-Western themes, including what he described as the US drive to attain "absolute invulnerability" at the expense of everyone else. But many Russian experts say that was mostly election rhetoric, and that in office Putin will seek greater cooperation and normal relations with the West. "Russian society is more anti-American than its leaders are," says Pavel Zolotaryov, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "Leaders have to take popular moods into account. But it's an objective fact that the US and Russia have more points in common than they have serious differences. If Obama wins the election, it seems likely the reset will continue."

### Nuclear---Generic

#### Fukushima means nuclear’s unpopular---our ev cites momentum which answers their turn

WNN 12 World Nuclear News. “US opinion divided on risks of nuclear energy,” 3/22, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-US\_opinion\_divided\_on\_risks\_of\_nuclear\_energy-2203124.html

The Fukushima accident in Japan has led to more Americans now believing that **the risks of using nuclear energy outweigh the benefits**, according to a new public opinion poll. The poll also found high support for natural gas, despite recent negative publicity about its extraction using hydraulic fracturing.¶ An online poll of 2056 adults surveyed between 6 and 13 February by Harris Interactive shows that 41% of US adults believe that the risks of nuclear outweigh its benefits, while 40% think the benefits outweigh the risks. A similar poll conducted in 2011, before the Fukushima accident occurred, indicated that 37% thought that the risks outweighed the benefits, while 42% believed the opposite. In an earlier poll, conducted in 2009, 34% thought the risks outweighed the benefits, while 44% thought they did not.¶ Harris noted that the poll results point to "some very distinct geographic differences among Americans." The southern states, it says, has the highest percentage of people believing the benefits outweigh the risks (at 43%), compared with 33% in the East and 41% in the Midwest and West. The South, Harris says, has twice as many nuclear power plants than the East, so the regional differences may be "a reflection of familiarity."¶ The poll also indicated that people aged 48 years or older are more likely to say that the benefits of nuclear outweigh the risks than younger people are.¶ Sarah Simmons, senior research executive at Harris Interactive, suggests: "Fukushima has been a reminder to Americans about the impact nuclear energy can have on communities." She adds, "As the lasting economic and environmental impact is revealed, American voters and policy makers are likely to have shifting opinions. As America's demand for inexpensive energy continues to grow, the nuclear industry, policy makers and regulators must focus on safety and transparency if they expect to gain the trust of Americans."

#### The public’s afraid of SMRs---causes backlash

Carper and Schmid 11 Ross Carper (rosscarper@gmail.com), a writer based in Washington state, is the founding editor of the creative nonfiction project BeyondtheBracelet.com. Sonja Schmid (sschmid@vt.edu) is an assistant professor in Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Tech. “The Little Reactor That Could?” Issues in Science and Technology, http://www.issues.org/27.4/carper.html

Historically, nuclear energy has been entangled in one of the most polarizing debates in this country. Promoters and adversaries of nuclear power alike have accused the other side of oversimplification and exaggeration. For today’s industry, reassuring a wary public and nervous government regulators that small reactors are completely safe might not be the most promising strategy. People may not remember much history, but they usually do remember who let them down before. It would make more sense to admit that nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, with enormous benefits that might justify taking these risks. So instead of framing small reactors as qualitatively different and “passively safe,” why not address the risks involved head-on? This would require that the industry not only invite the public to ask questions, but also that they respond, even—or perhaps especially—when these questions cross preestablished boundaries. Relevant historical experience with small compact reactors in military submarines, for example, should not be off limits, just because information about them has traditionally been classified.

### At deterrence

#### Deterrence doesn’t solve accidental war

Rojansky and Collins 10 (Matthew, Deputy Director @ Russia and Eurasia Program @ Carnegie, and James, Director @ Russia and Eurasia Program @ Carnegie, “Why Russia Matters,” 8/18, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41409>)

1. Russia's nukes are still an existential threat. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons in stockpile and hundreds still on hair-trigger alert aimed at U.S. cities**.** This threat will not go away on its own; cutting down the arsenal will require direct, bilateral arms control talks between Russia and the United States. New START, the strategic nuclear weapons treaty now up for debate in the Senate, is the latest in a long line of bilateral arms control agreements between the countries dating back to the height of the Cold War. To this day, it remains the only mechanism granting U.S. inspectors access to secret Russian nuclear sites. The original START agreement was essential for reining in the runaway Cold War nuclear buildup, and New START promises to cut deployed strategic arsenals by a further 30 percent from a current limit of 2,200 to 1,550 on each side. Even more, President Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, have agreed to a long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely. But they can only do that by working together.

### uniqueness

#### Obama’s ahead in the newest polling and has arrested Romney’s momentum

Silver 10/26 Nate is an elections expert for the NYT. “Oct. 25: The State of the States,” 2012, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/oct-25-the-state-of-the-states/?gwh=9157D2A2D5EC17B9DE2F9DF51818F651>

Thursday was a busy day for the polls, with some bright spots for each candidate. But it made clear that Barack Obama maintains a narrow lead in the polling averages in states that would get him to 270 electoral votes. Mr. Obama also remains roughly tied in the polls in two other states, Colorado and Virginia, that could serve as second lines of defense for him if he were to lose a state like Ohio.¶ The day featured the release of 10 national polls, but there was little in the way of a consistent pattern in them. On average, the polls showed a tied race. Furthermore, among the nine polls that provided for a comparison to another poll conducted after the first presidential debate in Denver, the net result was unchanged, on average, with Mr. Obama gaining one percentage point or more in three polls, but Mr. Romney doing so in three others.¶ Mr. Obama held the lead in nine polls of battleground states on Thursday, as compared to three leads for Mr. Romney and two polls showing a tied race.¶ This tally exaggerates the lopsidedness of the polling a bit, since the state polls released on Thursday were something of a Democratic-leaning bunch, some of which had shown strong numbers for Mr. Obama previously.¶ Mr. Romney’s strongest number came in a Fox News poll of Virginia, which had him 2 points ahead there – a sharp reversal from a 7-point advantage there for Mr. Obama before the Denver debate. However, Mr. Romney’s worst poll of the day was probably also in Virginia, where Public Policy Polling showed Mr. Obama’s lead expanding to 5 points from 2.¶ Among the 10 polls that provided for a comparison to another poll conducted after the Denver debate, Mr. Obama gained 1 percentage point, on average. The past week of polling suggests that Mr. Romney is no longer improving his position in the race.¶ Whether Mr. Obama has any momentum of his own, such as because of this week’s debate in New York, is less clear. To me, it looks more like a gradual reversion to the mean than anything all that assertive.¶ At the same time, Mr. Obama has led in the polling averages all year in states that would allow him to win the Electoral College, and that remains the case now.

#### Obama will win---swing states, models, ground game, enthusiasm, early voting

Klein 10/25 Ezra is a politics writer for the Washington Post. “Where the 2012 presidential election is right now,” 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/10/25/where-the-2012-presidential-election-is-right-now/?wprss=rss\_ezra-klein

State polls: Barack Obama holds a slight but persistent lead in the battleground states. Real Clear Politics puts him up in Ohio, New Hampshire, Iowa, Nevada, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan — which is **more than enough to win the election**. Romney is up in Florida, Colorado and North Carolina. Virginia is tied. The Pollster.com list is exactly the same, save for Obama holding slight leads in Colorado and Virginia. Note that in all the polling averages, Obama’s lead in Ohio is larger than Romney’s lead in Florida.¶ Models: At this point, I don’t know of any continuously updated model that shows Romney ahead. Nate Silver’s model gives Obama a 71 percent chance of winning. Sam Wang’s meta-analysis predicts 293 electoral votes for Obama. Drew Linzer’s Votamatic predicts 332 electoral votes for Obama.¶ Ground game: No one pretends that Romney’s ground game is anything close to what the Obama campaign has put together. Conventional wisdom is that a good ground game can get you about 2 percentage points in the polls. If that proves true here, **it will be decisive**. (For more on this, read Molly Ball’s excellent survey of the two ground games.) ¶ Enthusiasm: The conventional wisdom through much of this election is that Democrats face an enthusiasm gap. But that’s become hard to spot in the polls. The latest Washington Post/ABC News tracker, for instance, puts Romney up by 1 point among likely voters, and reports that 95 percent of Obama’s supporters say they’re enthusiastic about voting and 93 percent of Romney voters say the same.¶ Early voting: Absolutely everything I’ve heard suggests the Obama campaign is meeting and exceeding its early voting targets. You can see some on-the-ground evidence of this from Jon Ralston’s look at early voting in Nevada, which is showing huge numbers for the Democrats, and the Time poll of Ohio, which showed a huge lead for Democrats among early voters. Democrats also appear to lead in early voting in North Carolina. Note that Obama is casting a highly publicized early vote in Chicago today. Aaron Blake’s survey of the early voting — which includes some evidence that Republicans are beginning to tighten the margin — is worth reading.

#### Err neg---polls underestimate true turnout for Obama and he’s ahead where it matters

Wright 10/25 Robert is a senior editor at The Atlantic. “It's Official: Romney Has Zero Momentum,” 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/its-official-romney-has-zero-momentum/264141/

[1] Obama's numbers in swing states are running ahead of his numbers nationally. When the national polls were moving in Romney's direction, this gap may have been partly due to the fact that, because swing states polls were being done less often than national polls, swing state polls were lagging indicators. But when, as now, national polls are flat, and swing state polls are being conducted more and more often, that ceases to be a plausible explanation for the difference.¶ [2] **The polls, especially in swing states, may underpredict Obama's election day** numbers. These polls count only the responses of "likely voters"--a subset of the "registered voters" the pollsters interview. Obama tends to do better with the latter than the former. And some people think that, because Obama's "ground game" is better than Romney's, more Obama voters whom pollsters put in the "registered but not likely" category will wind up voting.¶ These two factors explain why, though Romney is slightly ahead in national "likely voter" polls, **Obama is a clear favorite** in the betting markets. As I write this, Intrade gives him a 62 percent chance of winning.

### Obama Winning---AT: Colorado Study

#### Reject the Colorado study

Lewis 8/23 Eric is a writer for the Daily Kos citing Nate Silver. “Nate Silver Calls B.S. on U. of Colorado Election Prediction Model UPDATED,” 2012, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/08/23/1123481/-Nate-Silver-Calls-B-S-on-U-of-Colorado-Election-Prediction-Model

If you were demoralized by news of the recent election model that predicts a Romney victory, don't be. Turns out it's bullshit. ¶ Touted as a model "with 100% success rate for the past thirty years", Nate Silver tells us that it is, in fact, a brand new model that has never been used before! ¶ Nate also **finds "glaring problems with their methodology**". ¶ Follow me after the jump for an exact transcript of Nate's tweets last night... ¶ Nate posted these tweets in fairly rapid succession late last night: ¶ A Denver Post reporter asked me (bit.ly/MNOF1C) about this U. of Colorado election model (bit.ly/O7pN4I). (1/5) ¶ It's late, so I'll be blunt: I saw their paper and I think there are **glaring problems** with their methodology. (2/5) ¶ The U. of Colo. model fits the equivalent of **7 unknowns to 8 elections**. That's not a good idea. (3/5) ¶ The Colo. model also assumes huge effects from unemployment if incumbent is a Dem., but none if he's GOP. Hard claim to defend. (4/5) ¶ If you want a "fundamentals" model that shows Romney winning, the Hibbs model is a lot more sensible. bit.ly/SqgfnH (5/5) ¶ Also, it's **false advertising** to claim CU model has predicted the last 8 elections right. It's a new model. Hasn't predicted anything yet.